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Abstract: 
In the last two decades, several serious accidents at large-scale technological systems that have had grave 
consequences, such as that at Bhopal, have primarily been attributed to human error. However, further investigations 
have revealed that humans are not the primary cause of these accidents, but have inherited the problems and 
difficulties of working with complex systems created by engineers. The operators have to comprehend malfunctions 
in real time, respond quickly, and make rapid decisions to return operational units to normal conditions, but under 
these circumstances, the mental workload of operators rises sharply, and a mental workload that is too high increases 
the rate of error. Therefore, cognivitive human features such as situation awareness (SA) – one of the most important 
prerequisite for decision-making - should be considered and analyzed appropriately. This paper applys the SA Error 
Taxonomy methodology to analyze the role of SA in three different accidents: (1) A runaway chemical reaction at 
Institute, West Virginia killing two employees, injuring eight people, and requiring the evacuation of more than 
40,000 residents adjacent to the facility, (2) The ignition of a vapor cloud at Bellwood, Illinois that killed one person, 
injured two employees, and caused significant business interruption, and (3) An explosion at Ontario, California 
injuring four workers and caused extensive damage to the facility. In addition, the paper presents certain requirements 
for cognitive operator support system development and operator training under abnormal situations to promote 
operators„ SA in the process industry. 
Keywords: Situation awareness, Error taxonomy, Process safety, Abnormal situations, Operator support systems, 
Operators‟ training. 
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1. Introduction 
In the early morning hours of December 3
rd
 of 1984, more than 40 metric tons of methyl isocyanate 
(MIC) gas leaked into the air from a pesticide plant located in the region of Bhopal, central India and 
caused one of the worst industrial disasters in history. Several hundred thousand people in towns nearby 
were exposed to the chemicals, and approximately 3,800 were killed immediately, at least 600,000 were 
injured, and at least 6,000 have died since (Broughton 2005). Three decades after the disaster, still high 
levels of contamination of toxic organic chemicals are found in the soil and water samples. The 
investigation of the disaster showed that on account of a series of mechanical and human errors in the 
production plant, water entered a tank containing a large amount of MIC, reacted exothermically and 
increased the temperature and pressure inside the tank, resulting in the release of MIC into the 
atmosphere. Although multiple factors including poor maintenance, the failure of safety systems and the 
substandard operating procedure have been identified as the underlying causes of the accident, the 
accident was officially blamed on human error as workers did not close the critical isolation valves before 
pipes were flushed with water and did not shut down the flare (Shrivastava, 1992). 
The tragic event at Bhopal provides an extreme example of accidents in large-scale technological 
systems that have been attributed to human error. There are also several other accidents that show the 
difficulties of operators in working with complex systems or facing data overload. In fact, the majority of 
these accidents are caused by a combination of many factors which can be found in the lack of human 
factor considerations. Further investigation has revealed that of the human factors, operators‟ situation 
awareness (SA) is one of the most important prerequisite for decision–making (Endsley, 1995; Kaber and 
Endsley, 1998; Niu et al., 2009; Niu et al., 2013). Situation awareness describes how operators in 
dynamic complex systems develop and maintain a sufficient awareness of „what is going on‟ in order to 
perform tasks successfully. Therefore, SA is likely to be at the root of many accidents in the process 
industry, where multiple goals must be pursued simultaneously, multiple tasks require the operator‟s 
attention, operator performance is under high time stress, and negative consequences associated with poor 
performance are anticipated (Naderpour et al., 2014b). In the case of the Texas City, TX BP Amoco 
Refinery explosion on 23 March 2005, where 15 workers were killed and 170 injured, several failures in 
control instrumentation and alarms caused an overfilled and over-pressurized tower to discharge a large 
quantity of flammable liquid into the atmosphere. The control room operator could not maintain good SA 
when monitoring this complex, dynamic environment, and an ignition created one of the worst industrial 
disasters in recent US history (Pridmore, 2007). 
 Today in many large-scale technological systems, operators are moved to a control room far away 
from the physical process, where automated systems pass more and more information to them. In fact, the 
automated systems and their over-deployment have changed the nature of operators work. In the past, the 
systems were analogue and a casual visit at the plant site was sufficient to monitor the progress and 
production of plants (Nazir et al., 2014c). Operators now must be alert in order to monitor, assess, and 
understand the incoming information from various sources and act/react accordingly. The decisions made 
by operators define the outcomes of possible abnormal situations, near misses, or even accidents. A recent 
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report shows that the loss of abnormal situations cost 20 billion USD for US process plants every year. 
Among the attributes triggering these abnormal situations the contribution of human errors has been 
found to be 50% (Walker et al., 2011).  
This paper highlights the role of SA in three process accidents in recent US history taken from 
Chemical Safety Board (CSB) investigation reports (www.csb.gov), and presents certain requirements for 
improving operators‟ SA. The accidents include a runaway chemical reaction which occurred at a 
methomyl production facility, an explosion at an open top tank located in a chemical mixing area, and an 
explosion at an ethylene oxide sterilization facility. The accidents were formally investigated by CSB and 
directly blamed on human error; however, the role of SA remained unexplained which was intriguing for 
authors to investigate in this paper. The investigation reports provide sufficient real data, information and 
other material from these safety-critical environments than can help human factor analysts to conduct 
proper analyses. All of these are done in the following sections by (a) an introduction to SA and 
distributed SA in the process industry, (b) an accident analysis methodology, (c) three process accident 
analyses, (d) an overview of the requirements to maintain and promote SA in large-scale technological 
systems, and (e) concluding remarks. 
2. Situation Awareness and Process Industry 
To date, several SA models have been developed; however, Endsley‟s three-level model has 
undoubtedly received the most attention. This model describes SA as “the perception of the elements in 
the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the 
projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1995). The three-level model describes SA as an 
internally held product, comprising three hierarchical levels that is perception, comprehension, and 
projection, that is separate from the processes called situation assessment, used to achieve it. Operators 
actively try to construct a coherent, logical explanation to account for their observations. This cognitive 
activity involves two related concepts: the mental model and the situation model. Mental models refer to 
mechanisms whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and explanations of 
system functioning. Mental models embody stored long-term knowledge about the systems that can be 
called upon during interaction with the relevant system when needed. A situation model is described as a 
schema depicting the current state of the mental model of the system. Endsley believes that the situation 
model provides a useful window on the broader mental model (Endsley, 2000b). 
Kaber and Endsley (1998) believe that many of the performance and safety problems that currently 
occur in the process control arena are the result of difficulties with operators‟ SA. The analysis of 
offshore drilling accidents has revealed  that more than 40% of such accidents are related to SA, and that 
the majority of those SA errors (67%) occurred at the perceptual level, 20% concerned comprehension, 
and 13% arose during projection (Sneddon et al., 2013). Nazir et al. (2012) highlight the importance and 
significance of SA for Field Operators and Control-Room Operators in the process sector and identify the 
major factors that influence their SA. Naderpour et al. (2014c) highlight the role of SA in performance of 
process operators when they confront abnormal situations and propose a method to model the operators‟ 
mental models about such situations using Bayesian networks (Naderpour et al., 2015). They then 
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developed a cognition-driven SA support system to assist operators in safety critical environments 
(Naderpour et al., 2014b). 
Today, in the process industry the overall performance of systems depends on coordinated work 
among individuals that have responsibility for different subsets of goals, different access to data, and 
different situation perspectives. Therefore, there is a growing interest in understanding the cognitive and 
collaborative factors that enable such teams to work effectively (Roth et al., 2006). Thus, the concepts of 
team SA and shared SA are equally important in this regard. The degree to which every team member 
possesses SA on these elements for task performance is team SA (Kaber and Endsley, 1998). Thus, the 
success or failure of a team depends on the success or failure of each of its team members. In contrast, 
shared SA is defined as the degree to which team members possess the same SA on shared SA 
requirements (Endsley and Jones, 2001). Shared SA allows team members to efficiently coordinate work 
by enabling them to understand what is going on with the task, interpret what others are doing, and 
anticipate what will happen next. It enables team members to anticipate the information and support 
needs of other team members, resulting in reduced need for explicit communication and improved action 
coordination (Roth et al., 2006). However, Stanton et al. (2006) showed that because of complexity of 
current socio-technical systems and the increasing presence of teams, the concept of shared SA is not able 
to explain appropriately the interactions between agents (both human and non-human) in subsystems. 
Therefore, the concept of compatible SA has emerged. Rather than possess shared SA, the new 
distributed SA (DSA) based on compatible SA suggests that team members possess unique, but 
compatible, portions of awareness. The distributive nature of process plants, the importance and necessity 
of coordination and communication among various team members, located at different locations, the co-
existence of technical and non-technical personnel within different units/sections of the plant call for a 
greater appreciation of DSA. Generally, operators are expected to monitor recurrently the dynamics of the 
process and to make timely correct decisions based on their mutual comprehension deduced from the 
available information that is changing dynamically. Team members experience a situation in different 
ways, as defined by their own personal experience, goals, roles, tasks, training, skills and so on. So whilst 
some of the information required by two different team members may be „shared‟ in the sense that they 
both need to attend to it as part of their job, their resultant understanding and use of it is different. 
Ultimately, the picture developed by each team member is unique to themselves. Compatible awareness is 
therefore the phenomenon that holds distributed systems together (Salmon et al., 2009). The first effort to 
use the DSA in improving process safety has been conducted by Nazir et al. (2014c). They explain how 
the ultimate consequences of abnormal situations depend on the shared understanding, compatibility, and 
effective communication among operators. They also highlight the importance of a shared mental model 
and joint cognition to facilitate communication and the subsequently necessary actions. 
3. The Accident Analysis Methodology 
This study aims to analyze the role of SA behind three process accidents. The current section reviews 
the taxonomies of human error, and presents the methodology of this paper. 
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 3.1. Taxonomies of Human Error 
The most applicable taxonomies to the context of human error are those taxonomies that are 
predominantly conceptual in nature. They focus on understanding the cognitive process involved in the 
production of human error rather than describing the observable characteristic of the error. Five popular 
conceptual human error taxonomies include: 
 Situation Awareness Error Taxonomy (Endsley, 1999) 
 Model of Internal Human Malfunction (Rasmussen, 1982) 
 Model of Unsafe Acts (Reason, 1990) 
 Information Processing Model  (Wickens and Flach, 1988) 
 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)  (Shappel and Wiegmann, 2000) 
These taxonomies represent a comprehensive view of the different types of human error that lead to 
unsafe acts. Among these taxonomies, the HFACS and the SA Error Taxonomy provide the greatest 
benefit in categorizing the context of human error (Leiden et al., 2001). The impetus for HFACS came 
from the absence of taxonomies of latent failures and unsafe acts within Reason‟s Swiss Cheese model, 
which limited its utility as an aviation accident analysis method. HFACS was subsequently developed 
based on an analysis of aviation accident reports and provides analysts with taxonomies of failure modes 
across the following four levels: unsafe acts; pre-conditions for unsafe acts; unsafe supervision; and 
organizational influences (Salmon et al., 2012). In addition, no single taxonomy of human error had been 
generally accepted by accident investigators and human factor researchers for addressing all causal 
factors. Hence, it was the goal for developing HFACS that it be utilized as a comprehensive framework to 
be used to identify human error. Although HFACS is comprehensive, it lists “loss of SA” as a single 
human causal condition under the second level. Given the research efforts to understand how and what is 
needed to improve SA, the single line item for “loss of SA” is too simplistic. Hence, the use of SA Error 
Taxonomy seems more appropriate for this study. 
3.2. Situation Awareness Error Taxonomy 
The taxonomy for classifying and describing errors in SA is based on the three-level model developed 
by Endsley (1995). The taxonomy incorporates factors effecting SA at each of its three levels. This 
methodology has been relied upon in several researches to investigate the causal factors underlying major 
accidents. For instance, Endsley (2000a) applied this taxonomy to analyze aircraft accidents in the US. 
Jones and Endsley (1996) used the taxonomy in a more extensive study of SA errors in aviation incidents 
involving pilots and air traffic controllers. It has also been utilized in analyzing maritime accidents (Grech 
et al., 2002). Table 1 describes the SA Error Taxonomy elements (Endsley, 1995) and provides 
descriptions for such elements in the process industry. 
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Table 1: SA Error Taxonomy. 
Error Type  Error Description 
Level 1: Failure to correctly perceive information 
Data not available Data are not available due to failure of the system design to present it 
or failure in the Distributed Control System (DCS) or other 
communication and control systems. 
Data hard to discriminate or detect Data are available; however, control room conditions such as 
inadequate lighting, noise, and obstructions blocking view, or design 
limitations such as poorly presented process equipment data in 
human-system interfaces (HSIs), or because of nature of data, prevent 
operators to detect or discriminate data. 
Failure to monitor or observe data Data are available, but are not scanned due to simple omission, 
attentional narrowing, distractions due to multi-tasking, or high 
workload. 
Misperception of data Data are misperceived due to influence of prior expectations or 
misunderstood due to task distraction.  
Memory loss Forgetting information which is due to disruptions in normal routine 
or startup operations, or high workload. 
Level 2: Failure to correctly integrate or comprehend information 
Lack of or poor mental model Poor mental model does not enable the combining of information 
needed to meet goals. Primarily associated with automated systems. 
Use of incorrect mental model Interpretation of cues through an expected, but wrong, mental model 
of the system behavior leads to the incorrect assessment of the 
situation. 
Over-reliance on default values Routine expectations of the system are assumed even though 
conflicting information is available, but not accessed. 
Other Information is not properly integrated or comprehended due to 
working memory lapses or other undetermined cognitive reasons. 
Level 3: Failure to project future actions or state of the system 
Lack of or poor mental model Information of current state is correctly understood, but projection of 
that state into the near future fails because of poor understanding of 
how to do so. 
Over-projection of current trends The current state is projected into the future correctly. However, it is 
projected further into the future than for which the data is realistically 
valid. This, combined with not updating the projections at appropriate 
intervals, can lead to incorrect plans for the future. 
Other Projection of current state into the future fails because it is a 
demanding task that in a multi-tasking environment is not always 
performed. This is possibly due to the lower priority it is given or due 
to limits in cognitive resources. 
General 
Failure to maintain multiple goals Failure to maintain multiple goals in memory degrades SA across all 
three levels. 
Executing habitual schema Performing task automatically can result in important system cues 
being overlooked. 
Note: DCS is a dedicated system used to control manufacturing processes; it is connected to sensors and actuators, 
and uses set point controls to control process variables. 
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3.3. Methodology 
The SA Error Taxonomy described above was used to examine the following accidents. The data 
source used to support the analyses was the CSB reports (CSB, 2006, 2007, 2011). Initially three human 
factor analysts met to discuss the accidents and available data, information, and conducted interviews by 
the CSB. At any level, an SA error was induced by problems with system design including needed 
information not available, poorly presented, ambiguous, or presented in the wrong format. In addition, at 
any level, the errors in information processing including memory or attention limitations, failure in 
pattern matching or mental projection were considered. Although the SA Error Taxonomy does not cover 
the errors related to the DSA, the analysts also investigated these errors in occurrence of the accidents. By 
gaining an understanding of why SA problems occurred in these case studies, a summary was ultimately 
provided that paved the way in providing some recommendations in Section 5 to prevent many of these 
problems.  
4. The Role of Situation Awareness in Process Accidents  
Loss of SA, poor SA and lack of SA as identified causal factors are now popular terms in accident 
investigation reports among several domains including aviation, nuclear industry, power plants, military, 
and process industry (Salmon and Stanton, 2013). Although, SA itself is not the only cause of accidents, 
it plays an important role in operators‟ decision making in time- and safety-critical situations (Naderpour 
et al., 2014a). This section applies the SA Error Taxonomy to analyze the accidents. 
4.1. The Explosion at Institute, West Virginia 
On 28 August 2008 a runaway chemical reaction occurred at a methomyl production facility in 
Institute, West Virginia, USA. Highly flammable solvent sprayed from a 4,500 gallon pressure vessel 
known as a residue treater and immediately ignited, killing two employees and injuring eight firefighters 
and contractors. The intense fire burned for more than four hours, more than 40,000 residents were 
evacuated to shelter-in-place for over three hours, and the highway was closed for hours because of 
smoke disruption to traffic (CSB, 2011). Figure 1 shows the facility damage and aerial view of reported 
damaged properties. 
4.1.1. Process Description 
Methomyl is a white, crystalline solid insecticide with a slight sulfurous odor that can form an 
explosive mixture when dispersed in air. Methyl isocyanate (MIC) is one of the key chemicals used to 
make methomyl. It is highly reactive with water and must be stored in stainless steel or glass containers at 
temperatures below 40°C to prevent a highly exothermic reaction. The methomyl production process 
begins by reacting aldoxime with chlorine to make chloroacetaldoxime, which reacts with sodium methyl 
mercaptide to produce methylthioacetaldoxime (MSAO). MSAO reacts with methyl isocyanate to 
produce methomyl. Excess MIC is removed from the methomyl-solvent solution and the solution is then 
pumped to the crystallizers where an anti-solvent is added to cause the methomyl to crystallize. Finally, 
the crystallized methomyl is separated from the solvents in the centrifuges and the methomyl cake is 
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removed, dried, cooled, packaged in drums, and moved to the warehouse. The residual liquid from the 
centrifuges contains very small quantities of methomyl and other impurities (CSB, 2011). 
Distillation separates the solvents in solvent recovery flashers and recycles the solvents to the start of 
the process. The unvaporized solvents and impurities, including up to 22 percent methomyl, accumulate 
in the bottom of the flasher. The flammable liquids can be used as fuel in the facility steam boilers, but 
before this flammable waste liquid can be pumped to an auxiliary fuel tank, the methomyl concentration 
has to be reduced to not more than 0.5 percent by weight for environmental and processing considerations 
(CSB, 2011).  
The residue treater, which is a pressure vessel with a maximum allowable operating pressure of 50 
psig, is used to dilute the incoming flasher bottoms, and is designed to operate at a sufficiently high 
temperature, and with sufficient residence time, to decompose the methomyl in the flasher bottoms stream 
to below 0.5 percent by weight. The solvent and residual waste material is transferred to the auxiliary fuel 
tank for use as a fuel in the facility steam boiler. Vapor generated in the methomyl decomposition 
reaction exits through the vent condenser to the process vent system where toxic and flammable vapor is 
removed (CSB, 2011).  
4.1.2. Accident Timeline 
The residue treater accident occurred during the first methomyl restart after an extended outage to 
install a new process control system and a stainless steel pressure vessel. On the day of the accident at 
approximately 4:00, the outside operator manually opened the residue treater feed control valve and 
Figure 1: Facility damage and aerial view of reported damaged properties (CSB, 2011). 
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began feeding flasher bottoms into the almost empty vessel. With a low flow rate of about 1.5 gallons per 
minute, more than 24 hours would be required to fill the residue treater to 50 percent, the normal 
operating level. The outside operator started the recirculation pump at 18:15, as directed by the board 
operator. The residue treater liquid level was approximately 30 percent (1,300 gallons), the temperature 
ranged between 60°C and 65°C, still significantly below the critical decomposition temperature of 135°C, 
and the pressure remained constant at 22 psig. At 18:38, the temperature began to steadily rise at a rate of 
about 0.6 degrees per minute. At 22:21, the level was 51 percent when the recirculation flow suddenly 
dropped to zero. In less than three minutes, the temperature reached 141°C, rapidly approaching the safe 
operating limit of 155°C, and was climbing at the rate of more than two degrees per minute. At 
approximately 22:25, the residue treater high pressure alarm sounded at the work station. The board 
operator immediately observed that the residue treater pressure was above the maximum operating 
pressure and climbing rapidly but did not understand what was wrong. He therefore asked two outside 
operators to investigate why the pressure in the residue treater was unexpectedly increasing. About 10 
minutes later, it suddenly and violently ruptured (CSB, 2011). 
Approximately 2,200 gallons of flammable solvents and toxic insecticide residues sprayed onto the 
road and into the unit and immediately erupted in flames as severed electrical cables, or sparks from steel 
debris striking the concrete, ignited the solvent vapor. Debris was thrown in all directions, to a distance of 
some hundreds of feet. The blast over-pressure moderately damaged the unit control building and other 
nearby structures. Fortunately, a steel blanket protected a 6,700-gallon methyl isocyanate storage tank 
from flying debris and from the radiant heat generated by the nearby fires that burned for more than four 
hours. One employee died at the scene from blunt force trauma and thermal burn injuries, and the second 
employee died 41 days later. Residences, businesses, and vehicles as far as seven miles from the 
explosion epicenter sustained over-pressure damage that included minor structural and exterior damage, 
and broken windows. Acrid, dense smoke billowed from the fire into the calm night air for many hours. 
Smoke drifted over nearby roads, forcing many road closures and disrupting highway traffic. Methomyl 
and solvents were released from the residue treater, and solvents and other toxic chemicals, including 
flammable and toxic MIC, were released from ruptured unit piping. The released chemicals rapidly 
ignited, producing undetermined combustion products (CSB, 2011).  
4.1.3. Accident Analysis 
The runaway chemical reaction and loss of containment of the flammable and toxic chemicals was the 
result of deviation from the written start-up procedures and bypassing of critical safety devices intended 
to prevent such a condition occurring. In addition, it was indicated that inadequate DCS checkout and a 
poor human-system interface (HSI) prevented the operators from achieving correct operating conditions 
and adequate SA (Naderpour et al., 2014a).  
The new DCS system included several display screens that were designed to mimic the process flow 
incorporated automated icons for critical equipment, and to show operating status and other parameters; 
Figure 2 shows the installed DCS interface. 
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Figure 2: The DCS interface (CSB, 2011). 
 
In this case, the data were available to the board operator and no loss of communication with the DCS 
or any failure in the DCS, were reported. However, the new control system significantly changed the 
interactions between the board operators and the DCS interface. The new visual displays and modified 
command entry method changing from a keyboard to a mouse influenced the usability of the HSI and 
impaired human performance. The increased complexities of the new operating system challenged 
operators as they had to familiarize themselves with the system and units of measurement for process 
variables that differed from those in the previous system. In addition, the new work station had five 
display screens available to monitor the processes and one display screen dedicated to process alarms. 
Some methomyl equipment required the operators to use at least three of the five display screens. The 
routine activities like starting a reaction or troubleshooting alarms would require operators to move 
between multiple screens to complete a task. Therefore, it concluded that the data were very hard to 
discriminate and deviation from safety set points to be detected. 
In addition to identified level 1 SA errors, four level 2 SA errors that might have occurred were 
determined. Firstly, there was a lack of a good mental model, most frequently associated with the new 
automated system, as the facility management did not provide comprehensive formal training and practice 
using the new DCS for the operators. They incorrectly assumed the methomyl and oxime board operators 
had become proficient from the many operating hours using the DCS on the Larvin unit, which was 
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adjacent unit to the residue treater. Secondly, it is worth noting that the wrong mental model or the mental 
model of a similar system, i.e. methomyl unit, might be used to interpret information, leading to an 
incorrect diagnosis or understanding of the situation. Thirdly, over-reliance on defaults in the mental 
models might be another problem. These defaults could be thought of as general expectations about how 
parts of the system function that might be used in the absence of real time data. Finally, it was also 
possible that several pieces of information were not properly integrated because of working memory 
limitations or other unknown cognitive lapses.  
Apart from individual SA errors, another important contributing factor can be referred to inadequate 
SA among night shift and day shift operators. Night shift outside and board operators did not inform the 
day shift crew that they had started filling the residue treater with flasher bottoms, and the methomyl unit 
day shift operator neglected to inform the incoming night shift operator that the lab results from the 
scheduled flasher bottoms sample identified excessively high methomyl concentration. This can be 
attributed to loss of DSA as the lack of communication among the agents, which are different teams in 
this case, resulted/enabled the accident.  
4.2. The Explosion at Bellwood, Illinois 
On 14 June 2006, the ignition of a vapor cloud generated by mixing and heating a flammable liquid in 
an open top tank located in a chemical mixing area in Bellwood, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, killed one 
contractor and injured two employees, and caused a significant business interruption. The accident 
occurred when an operator was mixing and heating a flammable mixture of heptane and mineral spirits in 
a 2,200-gallon tank equipped with steam coils (Figure 3). The finished product, “Super Clean and Tilt”, is 
a proprietary mixture which is applied to cured concrete surfaces to prevent bonding with wet concrete 
(CSB, 2007).  
4.2.1. Process Description 
The process for making Super Clean and Tilt required several hours of mixing and heating. To begin 
heating, the operator manually opened the steam valves to the tank heating coils and adjusted the 
temperature controller to maintain the temperature at 73°C. When the batch process was completed, the 
Steam Out 
Steam In 
Temperature Controller 
Control Valve 
Steam Coils 
Vent Duct 
Figure 3: Vapor spilling and vapor cloud propagation (CSB, 2007). 
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operator closed the steam valves and allowed the mixture to cool. The mixing tank was not equipped with 
a temperature display or high temperature alarm, and there was no backup shutoff device. The procedure 
for this mixture required the operator to verify the temperature by climbing the stairs to the upper level to 
measure it using a hand-held infrared thermometer, to monitor the situation and to conduct appropriate 
actions when necessary (CSB, 2007). 
4.2.2. Accident Timeline 
On the day of the accident, when the operator was adding an ingredient to the batch, he observed a 
“dense fog” accumulating on the floor below the tank.  He immediately notified a senior operator who 
helped him shut down the operation. They both exited the building and advised workers in adjoining areas 
to leave. As the vapor cloud spread throughout the mixing area and surrounding workspaces, other 
employees exited the building. Within about 10 minutes after the operator first observed the vapor cloud, 
most employees who were working in the area had evacuated before the cloud got ignited. The pressure 
created by the ignition blew the doors open to an adjacent area, killing a contracted delivery driver and 
injuring two employees. The Bellwood Fire Department battled a fire confined to a bagged resin storage 
area for about three and one-half hours. The fire and pressure from the initial ignition produced moderate 
damage to the structure and interrupted operations for one month (CSB, 2007). 
4.2.3. Accident Analysis 
The most important contributing factor to the accident was associated with the physical environment, 
i.e. the temperature controller malfunctioned, which allowed the steam valve to remain open and heat the 
mixture to its boiling point. At the basic level, important information i.e. the inside of the tank 
temperature was not available to the operator, due to a failure of the system design. Furthermore, the 
system lack of a high temperature alarm, made it difficult for the operator to perceive important 
information which therefore contributed to the operator‟s reduced SA, resulting in the overflow of vapor 
from the tank. As the operator was responsible to verify the temperature during the production cycle, 
another hypothesis is that the information was available via infrared thermometer, but for various reasons, 
was not observed by the operator. This is due to several factors, including simple omission, attentional 
narrowing and external distractions that prevented the operator from attending to important information. 
High taskload, even momentary, might be another factor that prevents important information from being 
attended to. It is also probable that the operator attended to the temperature, but misperceived due to the 
influence of prior expectations, i.e. seeing what was expected rather that what was there. Finally, it was 
even possible that the operator initially perceived information then forgot about it due to high workload.  
4.3. The Explosion at Ontario, California 
On 19 August 2004, an explosion inside an air pollution control device and medical products 
sterilization chamber at an Ethylene Oxide (EO) sterilization facility in Ontario, California, injured four 
workers and severely damaged the facility (Figure 4). Neighboring businesses were evacuated for several 
hours and operations at the facility were disrupted for nine months (CSB, 2006). 
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4.3.1. Process Description 
Ethylene Oxide presents an exposure hazard in addition to its high flammability. It kills microbes by 
disrupting life-sustaining molecules. Cycle variables include EO concentration, duration of exposure, 
temperature, humidity, vacuum applied during sterilization, and gas washing and aeration required to 
remove residual EO. Pre-conditioning is the first stage of the medical product sterilization process. It lasts 
from 6 to 24 hours and involves subjecting products to high levels of humidity, and temperatures between 
27 and 49°C. Operators use forklifts to move products to the sterilization chambers. The sterilization 
process begins by placing pallets of products inside a large stainless steel chamber, applying a vacuum, 
and injecting pure EO to achieve a sterilizing concentration of approximately 400,000 ppm. At the end of 
this phase, the chamber gas mixture is evacuated to the acid scrubber that removes EO. Despite efforts to 
remove all of the EO from sterilized products, potentially toxic levels of EO remain in the chamber after 
gas washing. To purge this remaining EO, operators open the sterilizer door to approximately six inches, 
which automatically opens a ventilation duct located in the rear of the chamber. Operators leave the door 
in this position for several minutes to ventilate the chamber so that employees can safely enter to remove 
sterilized products. Air exhausted through the back-vent flows to the oxidizer, which removes the 
remaining EO from the airstream. After ventilating the chamber, operators completely open the sterilizer 
door and use forklifts to move products to the aeration rooms. Circulating air in the aeration rooms, also 
vented to the oxidizer, removes any remaining residual EO (CSB, 2006).  
The sterilization cycle is monitored and controlled from a computerized process control system 
located at the west end of the facility. The system automatically controls levels of humidity, temperature, 
pressure, EO, and dwell time. Facility management staff program cycle parameters and event sequencing 
into the system during the cycle design phase, based on specifications to achieve FDA
1
-mandated 
sterilization parameters. The system then controls the sequencing of that cycle from start to finish. Taking 
actions to manually intervene (advance or interrupt) a cycle sequence may present a considerable safety 
hazard because there is no monitoring or detection equipment to warn employees that an explosive 
concentration remains in the chamber (Nazir et al., 2014a). If an unrecoverable problem occurs during the 
sterilization cycle, operators can immediately abort the cycle by activating a button located on the control 
                                                          
1 Food and Drug Administration 
Figure 4: Facility damage (CSB, 2006). 
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room console. This initiates a pump that removes the high concentration gas from the sterilization 
chamber, followed by a sequence of gas washes that removes the remaining EO (CSB, 2006). 
4.3.2. Accident Timeline 
On the day of the accident, at approximately 1:30, the control system alerted operators of an EO 
injection failure during a cycle in Chamber 7. The operator immediately ran several routine system 
checks in the control room to determine that the alert was accurate, but was unable to identify any 
problems. The supervisor then decided to abort the cycle. In accordance with company protocol, they 
used the cycle abort button on the control room console. Upon completion of the abort cycle, operators 
removed the chamber contents to an aeration room, and the chamber was left open awaiting maintenance 
personnel. The maintenance supervisor arrived at the plant at approximately 7:30 and immediately 
assigned two technicians to work on the gas injection problem. He allowed maintenance personnel to 
enter a password to override computer safeguards, resulting in premature opening of the sterilizer door. 
Soon after that, the lower explosion limit alarm in the chamber was triggered, indicating the release of 
EO. The ignition of EO-air mixture took place before the oxidizer could be shut down (CSB, 2006). 
4.3.3. Accident Analysis 
A deeper look into the events reveals that the operators had difficulties in understanding the behavior 
and limitations of the automated system, relied upon poor mental models, which thus induced incorrect 
assumptions and led to wrong actions. The drawback of improperly designed automated systems was the 
progressive reduction of process understanding by the operators as they spent more time in passive 
vigilance instead of taking active decisions/actions. Consequently, they were unable to perform correctly 
when the system called for unconventional and even manual actions under abnormal situations. 
The poor mental model or over projecting current trends also made it difficult for the operators to 
project the possible consequences of their decisions in the near future. In some cases, operators may be 
fully aware of what is going on, but be unable to correctly project what that means for the future. 
Generally, mental projection is a very demanding task at which people are poor.  The lack of adequately 
designed job-specific maintenance-training methods was explicitly concluded by the analysts. 
4.4. Summary 
Overall, the accident analyses indicated that the primary cause of human errors in these environments 
was not related to poor decision making, but lack of SA. These errors were classified according to the SA 
Error Taxonomy. In the first accident, one of the identifiable SA errors was a level 1 SA error involving a 
failure to correctly discriminate data due to failures in appropriate design of a newly installed system and 
the related HSI. In addition, several level 2 SA errors due to lack of proper mental models have been 
identified. The second incident mainly resulted because of level 1 SA errors due to lack of appropriate 
operation system design. The occurrence of the third accident was attributed to levels 2 and 3 SA errors 
mainly due to poor mental models that prevented the operators from correctly comprehending the 
significance of the information and projecting the future state of the system. In summary, the identified 
SA errors can be categorized in two groups: 
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(1) Errors due to lack of appropriate design of operator support systems and proper presentation of 
information in HSIs: traditionally, the focus of most human-system studies is on the technical 
elements, and human factors are often neglected. This is due to well understood hardware reliability 
techniques, whereas the handling of human factors, by contrast, is difficult. These problems highlight 
the urgent need to discover cognitive decision support systems to lower operator workload and stress 
and consequently reduce the rate of errors made by operators.   
(2) Error due to poor mental models: as mental models refer to mechanisms whereby humans are able to 
generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and observed 
system states, and predictions of future states, the best way to change a mental model is through 
training. The training helps operators to describe the system, explain the system functioning and 
observed system states, and to predict the future system state, all of which are compatible with the 
three-level SA model. The Endsley approach presents mental models as default information that 
helps to form higher levels of SA even when needed data is missing or incomplete.  
5. Promoting Operators’ Situation Awareness 
Promoting SA is now an important design objective for process systems where the information flow is 
high and distributed among various agents, and poor decisions may lead to accidents and disasters. In 
today‟s process systems which employ digital instrumentation, control systems and computer-based 
human–system interfaces (HSIs), operators need a greater level of support to control and maintain the 
facilities in safe conditions due to an increasing amounts of information that are passed to them via 
automated systems. In addition, the dynamics of normal operating conditions vary according to the state 
of the process. They may be in abnormal situations; therefore, different algorithms and actions to handle 
such situations should be considered during the design phase. The existing literature have several studies 
showing the improvement of performance based on good SA maintained by the operators (Burkolter and 
Kluge, 2012). 
Traditionally, there are several approaches to prevent human error during operation of safety-critical 
systems; two important ones refer to the provision of better training programs for operators, and the 
improvement of operator support systems (Lee and Seong, 2014). The purpose of this section is to 
address these issues in the context of human factors and plant safety performance. Firstly, some 
requirements for developing cognitive operator support systems that can assist operators in their decision–
making from a human cognition perspective are presented. Secondly, a new operator training approach 
based on a real–time dynamic process simulator, a real time dynamic accident simulator amalgamated 
with immersive environment is introduced. The recommendations would promote operators‟ SA during 
normal and abnormal situations and consequently reduce human error and improve process systems 
performance. 
5.1. Operator Support Systems 
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Chemical processes contain multilevel control loops and interconnections, which need to be 
monitored and supervised for normal operations. Once the system becomes unstable, the conditions are 
referred to as abnormal situation, which can lead to near misses and possible accidents with both 
economic and human loss. The process plants have experienced a significant increase in multidimensional 
automation in the last two decades that have significantly increased the complexity and sensitivity of the 
role of operators and their teams. However, they lack the ability to intervene or tackle abnormal situations 
as they are usually designed for routine operating conditions (Nazir et al, 2014a). Therefore, any attempt 
to develop operator support systems should consider both normal and abnormal situations. Most prior 
support systems focus on the deviation of the process from an acceptable range of operation. Therefore, 
the use of quantitative knowledge and hardware failures has been relied on significantly. Most of them 
consider the identification of operation faults (Qian et al., 2008) or the prediction of process variables 
(Juricek et al., 2001) that will violate an emergency limit in the future; however, further research show 
that when faults occur, operators have to rely on their experience under working pressure to understand 
what is going on and to contribute a solution (Kluge et al., 2014). Therefore, designing and integrating 
appropriate approaches to develop cognitive support systems are highly recommended (Naderpour et al., 
2014b; Niu et al., 2013). 
Generally, operators perform two types of tasks to carry out their roles and responsibilities: primary 
tasks and secondary tasks. As illustrated in Figure 5, primary tasks consist of several cognitive tasks 
including monitoring and detection, situation assessment, response planning, and response 
implementation (O‟Hara and Persensky, 2011). Any breakdown in generic primary tasks can lead to a 
human error. Therefore, a balanced automated system that avoids an excessive workload for the operators 
and keeps them in the loop of decision-making, taking action, and updating the related information would 
benefit the process industry. The activities involved in extracting information from the environment are 
referred to as monitoring and detection. In today‟s process systems, these tasks are highly supported 
through various heterogeneous sensors and appropriate signal-processing methods that are used to extract 
as much information as possible about the dynamic environment. Good monitoring results in operator‟s 
perception or SA level 1.  
Situation assessment is the evaluation of current conditions to determine that they are acceptable or to 
determine the underlying causes of abnormalities. Situation assessment which underlies the achievement 
of SA is therefore critical to taking proper human action. Thus, the HSI besides providing alarms and 
displays that are used to obtain information to support situation assessment must provide additional 
Generic Primary Tasks 
Situation 
Assessment 
Monitoring 
and Detection 
Response 
Planning 
Response 
Implementation 
Figure 5: General primary tasks. 
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support for assessing a situation. This development corresponds to SA levels 2 and 3 that support 
operators to infer real situations and to project their status in the near future. Response planning refers to 
deciding upon a course of action to address the current situation. In general, response planning involves 
operators using their situation model to identify goal states and the transformations required to achieve 
them. Response implementation means performing the actions specified by response planning. These 
actions include selecting a control, providing control input, and monitoring the system and process 
response (O‟Hara and Persensky, 2011). 
Apart from primary tasks, operators perform another kind of tasks that are referred to secondary tasks 
or “interface management tasks” such as navigating, configuring and arranging, that assist operators to 
perform the primary tasks successfully. Secondary tasks create workload and may take so much attention 
away from primary task performance and generate a “keyhole effect” (Seong, 2009) and thus affect 
operators‟ SA, which takes operator out-of-the-loop. Thus, secondary tasks should be carefully addressed 
in design reviews as well. In actual plant operation, individual operators typically do not perform these 
tasks alone; tasks are accomplished by the coordinated activity of multi-person teams. Therefore, the 
design of technology needs to consider not only individual performance but also team performance.  
5.2. Operators Training 
Inclusion of automation, advancement in technology, and sophisticated tools/software in the process 
industry have changed the roles and goals of the industrial operators. Therefore novel training paradigms 
are needed to couple to a cross-disciplinary approach, which can facilitate the operators performing their 
tasks better thus ensuring smoother, safer, and optimal operations within the available degrees of 
freedom. Even though the significance of training and skills development have been held in high esteem 
in domains like aviation and the military, limited resources have been allocated to this in the case of the 
process industry. Unfortunately, the lack of cross disciplinary expertise for the development and 
implementation of training methods has kept this domain in the „too hard basket‟.  
We propose the use of immersivity during the training of field as well as control room operators 
(Nazir et al. 2013). The immersive nature is essential for increasing the reliability of the training 
experience and for producing a positive impact on the psychological experience of the operator. 
“Immersion” is the subjective impression that one is participating in a holistic and realistic experience. 
The training tool proposed by the authors is a Plant Simulator (PS), which is capable of linking to any 
conventional Operator Training Simulator (OTS) and of exchanging information through a two-way 
communication channel. By incorporating in the OTS, the PS allows running the simulation of 
conventional operations, abnormal situations, and even accident events. The process simulator, accident 
simulator, 3D engine and performance assessment algorithms work in the background and show their 
results by means of the virtual immersive environment (Figure 6).  
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The PS training not only supports mental mapping and retention abilities of the participants, but also 
sets up an effective communication among operators working in different plant sections. It allows the 
operator to learn, understand, and practice the process details, control loops, interconnections, and 
constraints in a 3D immersive environment. In addition, simulated automation failures (which cannot be 
tested in a real plant) instill the skills of handling malfunctions, abnormal situations, coordination, skill 
acquisition and adaptability. This unique training method integrates the details of process plants, 
interconnections, and control loops and allows the operators to experience real situations (in a virtual 
environment) by practicing the tasks and experiencing the imperfect features of automated systems and 
their possible consequences. Adequately trained operators can properly interact with automated systems 
so to transform automation from curse to cure (Nazir et al. 2014a). 
For practice-based training, feedback on results as well as on performance is vital in order to correct 
the operators‟ mental model and to infer objectives for improvement. Therefore, the PS incorporates a 
complete automated assessment of the operator performance, which can allow the operators and managers 
to track the learning abilities during training sessions. Further details about the necessity of automated 
performance assessment and the algorithms that allow this novel methodology can be found in Manca et 
al. (2014). The PS has also demonstrated its efficacy in training operators with respect to well-established 
procedures that have existed since last two decades. For instance, polymerization processes are 
widespread and often based on catalytic reactions (Urdampilleta et al., 2006). Frequently, the addition of 
catalyst to the continuous operation is performed through injectors, which allows the catalyst to be mixed 
to the reacting flow. Such a procedure is run periodically (for example every month) and requires 
switching the catalyst inlet stream between the working and the spare injectors. The procedure requires 
several valves and buttons to be operated and pressure, temperature, and flow rate gauges to be read, 
while waiting for some process lines to be deactivated and finally reactivated. The overall procedure can 
Figure 6: A sketch of the Plant Simulator (PS) environment where the operator faces the 3D screen during the training 
session. 
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take a few minutes, but even a small error in the operation sequence may have severe repercussions for 
the plant. A single operation run out of sequence or at the wrong time may cause the shutdown of the 
whole plant. The loss of production is then dramatic and may reach millions of dollars in lost revenues. 
Again, the PS tailored for the section of the plant where the catalyst switch procedure is performed 
periodically, allows the operator to train and test his/her preparation with respect to the assigned sequence 
of actions (for example see Figure 7).  
The possibility of performing the simulated procedure several times, in front of the virtual 
reproduction of the plant, increases the self-efficacy of the trainee, who can measure his/her degree of 
training through the automated performance assessment. By practicing the training session several times, 
the trainee can track his/her improvements. This experience also induces proceduralization of actions, 
thus relieving a proportion of cognitive load and psychological stress related to the criticality of the 
procedure. Our results shows that the awareness of the operators is significantly improved when training 
with PS compared to the conventional methodologies adopted to train operators (Nazir et al. 2013). 
During a simulated accident scenario, the participants training with PS were able to mitigate the impact of 
the accident while they were not able to do this when using conventional training methods.  
As the tasks in the process industry requires collaborative efforts among team members, therefore, the 
3D simulator also allows the operators (and even non-technical staff) to experience a stressful situation 
and resolve it by working together in exactly the same manner as they would be on the real plant. A 
simulated accident scenario can provide the teams with real training to communicate the abnormality, 
weigh and analyze the parameters, and developed a shared mental model to reach correct and timely 
decisions to avert the impact of the simulated accident. Specifically, experiencing an accident scenario 
can scaffold trainees in a systematic way to make decisions and observe the outcomes of their decisions 
with reference to the accident scenario and therefore, reach conclusions and learn lessons that can be 
implemented or capitalized on in a real abnormal situation at the plant. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Figure 7: A trainee involved in the training session in the Plant Simulator catalytic reactions of polymerization 
processes (Nazir et al., 2014b). The distortion of the graphic of the Plant Simulator (green valve) is on account of its 
3D nature that can be experienced with 3D glasses only, as worn by the trainee. 
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Many attempts were made over the past 20 years to reduce human error in the process industry. The 
main conclusion is that few errors represent random events; instead, most human errors can be explained 
by human cognitive mechanisms. Of these cognitive mechanisms, an operator‟s situation awareness is 
considered to be one of the most important pre-requisite for decision–making, especially in time-, safety-
critical abnormal situations. This paper reviewed the role of SA in three accidents in the process sector 
and analyzed the SA related errors based on SA Error Taxonomy methodology. The identified SA errors 
were able to be totally categorized in two groups; errors due to a lack of appropriate design of operator 
support systems, and errors due to poor mental models. Therefore, the urgent need to discover cognitive 
support systems in order to lower operator workload and stress and consequently human errors were 
highlighted. In addition, a novel operator training method using a Plant Simulator and an Immersive 
Virtual Environment was presented. More empirical studies aiming at determining the long-term benefits 
of operator support systems and advanced operator training simulators on operators‟ SA can deepen the 
insights offered here. 
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